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Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states.  In particular, 
assume that the random wealth variable Xi dominates Yi via i
th-order stochastic dominance for 
i = M,N.  We show that the 50-50 lottery [XN + YM, YN + XM] dominates the lottery [XN + 
XM, YN + YM] via (N + M)
th-order stochastic dominance.  The basic idea is that a decision 
maker exhibiting (N + M)
th-order stochastic dominance preference will allocate the state-
contingent lotteries in such a way as not to group the two "bad" lotteries in the same state, 
where "bad" is defined via i
th-order stochastic dominance.  In this way, we can extend and 
generalize existing results about risk attitudes.  This lottery preference includes behavior 
exhibiting higher order risk effects, such as precautionary effects and tempering effects. 
JEL Code: D81. 
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Choice under uncertainty is often model speci￿c. Much debate in the literature dis-
cusses the pros and cons of the various types of valuation methods used in modeling
such decisions. The choice is made much easier when we have stochastic dominance
by one of the alternatives. In such a case, we will have agreement on the optimal
choice by a wide range of valuation methods. For example, suppose a corporation
believes its shareholders are all risk averse, de￿ned as an aversion to mean-preserving
spreads.1 Its shareholders would then unanimously favor a decision yielding the ran-
dom payout variable e X over the alternative set of payo⁄s e Y , whenever e X dominates
e Y via second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). This holds true for any model of
preferences that preserves a preference for SSD. For example, in an expected-utility
framework, this would hold whenever the utility function is increasing and concave.
The link between stochastic dominance and preferences within an expected-utility
1See Rothschild and Stiglitz [25].
1framework is particularly well known. If we restrict the utility function u to be
di⁄erentiable, then Nth-order stochastic dominance (NSD) of e X over e Y is equivalent
to unanimous preference of e X over e Y by any individual whose utility exhibits certain
properties. This equivalence has implications for non-expected utility models as well.
For example, suppose that all individuals satisfying NSD preference unanimously
prefer e X to e Y within an expected-utility framework. Then any non-expected utility
preference functional that satis￿es NSD preference would also lead to the choice of
e X over e Y .2
Consider the independent random variables e XN; e YN; e XM and e YM, and assume
that e Xi dominates e Yi via ith-order stochastic dominance for i = M;N. We show that
the 50-50 lottery [ e XN + e YM; e YN + e XM] dominates the lottery [ e XN + e XM; e YN + e YM]
via (N +M)th-order stochastic dominance. We also show that this result holds true
if we replace stochastic dominance with the special case of an ith-degree increase in
risk, as de￿ned by Ekern [8].
These rankings have implications for choice problems within particular classes of
valuation functionals over distribution functions. For the case of ith-degree increases
in risk, this characterization is shown to generalize the concept of risk apportionment,
as introduced by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [5]. For both ith-degree increases in
2A similar point was made by Zilcha and Chew [29].
2risk and stochastic dominance, we show how such lottery preference induces behav-
ior exhibiting higher-order risk e⁄ects, such as precautionary e⁄ects and tempering
e⁄ects. We use this interpretation to show how risk-management behavior typically
involves more than just the hedging of risks. Indeed, hedging occurs as a special
case where M = N = 1, where relatively good outcomes for one asset are paired
with relatively bad outcomes for another asset, and vice versa.
The next two sections present our basic model and main results. We then provide
several applications of our results to decsion making under risk and conclude by
discussing the implications of higher-order risk e⁄ects for risk-management behavior.
2 Stochastic Dominance and Nth Degree Risk
We start with a de￿nition of stochastic dominance.3 Assume that all random vari-
ables have bounded supports contained within the interval [a;b]. Let F denote the
cumulative distribution function for such a random variable. De￿ne F (0)(x) ￿ F(x)
and de￿ne F (i)(x) ￿
R x
a F (i￿1)(t)dt for i ￿ 1.
De￿nition 1 The distribution F weakly dominates the distribution G in the sense
of Nth-order stochastic dominance if
3See, for example, Ingersoll [13] and Jean [14,15].
3(i) F (N￿1)(x) ￿ G(N￿1)(x) for all a ￿ x ￿ b;
(ii) F (i)(b) ￿ G(i)(b) for i = 1;:::;N ￿ 2:
We write F NSD G to denote that F dominates G via Nth-order stochastic dom-
inance. If the random variables e X and e Y have cumulative distribution functions F
and G respectively, we also will take the liberty to say that e X NSD e Y . For N = 1;2;3,
we will use the more common notations for ￿rst-, second-, and third-order stochastic
dominance: FSD, SSD and TSD.
As a special case of stochastic dominance, Ekern [8] considers the following:
De￿nition 2 The distribution G has more Nth-degree risk than the distribution F
if
(i) F (N￿1)(x) ￿ G(N￿1)(x) for all a ￿ x ￿ b;
(ii) F (i)(b) = G(i)(b) for i = 1;:::;N ￿ 1:
Note that G has more Nth-degree risk than F is equivalent to saying that F NSD
G and the ￿rst N ￿ 1 moments of F and G are identical.4
The following two theorems express the well-known links between stochastic dom-
inance and expected utility, as well as Ekern￿ s extension of this result to increases
4The second condition follows easily from part (ii) in De￿nition 2 by integrating both F(i) and
G(i) by parts. The case where N = 3 is labeled as an "increase in downside risk" and given special
attention in a paper by Menezes et al. [21]. The case where N = 4 is examined in part by Menezes
and Wang [22].
4in Nth degree risk.5 We let u(w) denote the individual￿ s utility function. For
notational convenience, we use u(n)(w) to denote
dnu(w)
dwn .
Theorem 1 The following are equivalent:





au(t)dG, for all functions u such that sgn u(n)(w) = (￿1)n+1 for
n = 1;:::;N.
Theorem 2 The following are equivalent:





au(t)dG, for all functions u such that sgn u(N)(w) = (￿1)N+1.
3 Main Result
In this section, we examine a particular lottery preference over random wealth vari-
ables that can be ordered via stochastic dominance. We then extend the result to
increases in ith-degree risk.
Let [A;B] denote a lottery that pays either A or B, each with probability one-half.
Consider the mutually independent random variables e XN; e YN; e XM and e YM, and
5See Hadar and Russell [11] and Hanoch and Levy [12] who introduced this notion into the
economics literature for SSD. See Jean [14] and Whitmore [27], as well as Ingersoll [13] for extensions
to higher orders of stochastic dominance.
5assume that e Xi dominates e Yi via ith-order stochastic dominance for i = M;N. We
wish to compare the 50-50 lotteries [ e XN + e YM; e YN + e XM] and [ e XN + e XM; e YN + e YM].
Theorem 3 Suppose that e Xi dominates e Yi via ith-order stochastic dominance for i =
M;N. The lottery [ e XN + e YM; e YN + e XM] dominates the lottery [ e XN + e XM; e YN + e YM]
via (N + M)th-order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Let T be a positive integer and de￿ne UT ￿ fu j sgn u(n)(w) = (￿1)n+1
for n = 1;:::;Tg. For an arbitrary function u 2 UN+M de￿ne v(w) ￿ Eu(e YM +
w) ￿ Eu( e XM + w), where E denotes the expectation operator. We ￿rst show that
v 2 UN. To see this, consider any integer k, 1 ￿ k ￿ N. Observe that (￿1)ku(k) 2
UN+M￿k ￿ UM. Now sgn v(k)(w) = sgn [Eu(k)(e YM+w)￿Eu(k)( e XM+w)] = (￿1)k+1.
The second equality above follows since (￿1)ku(k) 2 UM and e XM MSD e YM. Thus,
v 2 UN.
The condition that e XN dominates e YN via Nth-order stochastic dominance, to-
gether with v 2 UN, implies that Ev( e XN) ￿ Ev(e YN), which by the de￿nition of v is
equivalent to
Eu( e XN + e YM) ￿ Eu( e XN + e XM) ￿ Eu(e YN + e YM) ￿ Eu(e YN + e XM): (1)
6Rearranging terms above, this inequality is equivalent to
1
2
fEu( e XN + e YM) + Eu(e YN + e XM)g ￿
1
2
fEu( e XN + e XM) + Eu(e YN + e YM)g, (2)
which is precisely the lottery preference claimed in the theorem.
The lottery preference expressed in Theorem 3 is analogous to the notion of "dis-
aggregating the harms" discussed by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [5], if we interpret
the "harms" as sequentially replacing each of the e X random variables with a e Y ran-
dom variable in the sum e XN + e XM. Or, said di⁄erently, it expresses a preference
for lotteries that combine "relatively good" assets with "relatively bad" ones, where
relatively good and bad are de￿ned via stochastic dominance.
The preferences described here lead to a partial ordering of the four alternative
sums of random variables, based upon stochastic dominance criteria:
e XN + e XM ￿ e Xi + e Yj ￿ e YN + e YM for (i;j) 2 f(M;N);(N;M)g. (3)
Note that the sums e XM + e YN and e XN + e YM cannot be ordered via stochastic domi-
nance. In the spirit of Menezes and Wang [22] we can refer to these two sums as the
"inner risks" and the sums e XN + e XM and e YN + e YM as the "outer risks." Theorem 3
thus expresses a preference for a 50-50 lottery over the two inner risks as opposed to
7a 50-50 lottery over the two outer risks.6
The following Corollary extends our main result to Ekern￿ s ordering by Nth-
degree risk. The proof follows easily from the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary Suppose that e Yi has more ith-degree risk than e Xi for i = M;N. Then
the lottery [ e XN + e XM; e YN + e YM] has more (N + M)th-degree risk than the lottery
[ e XN + e YM; e YN + e XM].
Of course, from its de￿nition, stochastic dominance of order i implies stochastic
dominance of order j, 8j > i. Still, one might wonder whether (M + N)th-order
stochastic dominance is the best one can do in Theorem 3.7 In particular, suppose
in Theorem 3 that e Xi does not dominate e Yi via (i￿1)th-order stochastic dominance
for i ￿ 2. It is easy to derive examples for which the lottery [ e XN + e YM; e YN + e XM]
dominates the lottery [ e XN+ e XM; e YN+e YM] via (N+M)th-order stochastic dominance,
but not for order N + M ￿ 1. Indeed, one can use any set of random variables
satisfying the conditions of the Corollary. If e Yi has more ith-degree risk than e Xi for
i = M;N, then e Xi dominates e Yi via ith-order stochastic dominance, but not of any
lower order. Thus, the lottery [ e XN + e YM; e YN + e XM] cannot stochastically dominate
the lottery [ e XN + e XM; e YN + e YM] for order N + M ￿ 1.
6A similar analogy is made by Eeckhoudt et al. [6], who describe a lattice structure on the
ranking of the lottery components and subsequently de￿ne a preference functional over the lattice
as being submodular.
7We thank a referee for being the "one" who ￿rst raised this issue with us.
8On the other hand, we can ￿nd examples of random variables that satisfy the con-
ditions in Theorem 3, but for which the lotteries exhibit stochastic dominance of an
order less than M+N. As one example, let e X1 ￿ 2, e Y1 ￿ 0, e X2 ￿ [1:9 (0:6);10 (0:4)]
and e Y2 ￿ [0;2], where the parentheses for e X2 are probabilities. Then it is straight-
forward to show that e X1 ￿1 e Y1 and e X2 ￿2 e Y2, with no ￿rst-order dominance for e X2
over e Y2; and yet [ e X1 + e Y2; e Y1 + e X2] ￿2 [ e X1 + e X2; e Y1 + e Y2].8
Hence, the lotteries in Theorem 3 are guaranteed to satisfy (M + N)th-order
stochastic dominance, but might or might not satisfy dominance of a lower order.
Of course, as our ￿rst example above explains, by the Corollary we cannot have an
increase in risk less than degree M + N.
4 Applications
In this section we illustrate the applicability of our results. In particular, we demon-
strate how Theorem 3 and its Corollary can be used to gain additional insight into
a few extant concepts such as downside risk aversion and precautionary demand for
saving. We also show how our framework extends the notions of precautionary
8Recall that second-order stochastic dominance can be characterized by saying that the dis-
tribution of e Y2 can be obtained from that of e X2 by sequences of mean-preserving spreads and of
shifts in probability mass to the left. In our example, the shifts to left are signi￿cant, whereas the
mean-preserving spread is much less so. This leads to a lottery preference of order 2, not just one
of order 3.
9e⁄ects, tempering e⁄ects and risk apportionment.
4.1 Downside Risk
We ￿rst use an illustration that is the result of an experiment by Mao [20], and was
used by Menezes et al. [21] to motivate the concept of aversion to downside risk
(i.e. prudence). Consider the following two lotteries. Lottery A pays 1000 with a
probability of 3
4 and pays 3000 with a probability of 1
4. Lottery B pays zero with a
probability of 1
4 and pays 2000 with a probability of 3
4. Note that both lotteries have
the same ￿rst two moments. Individuals who prefer lottery A to lottery B exhibit
"downside risk aversion."9
This lottery preference follows from our Corollary by de￿ning
e X1 ￿ 2000
e Y1 ￿ 1000
e X2 ￿ 0
e Y2 ￿ [￿1000;+1000], a 50-50 lottery.
9A recent experimental paper by Baltussen et al. [1] also supports this approach. Although
they interpret their experiments for Prospect Theory, they use mean preserving spreads for "gains"
and "losses," which we can reinterpret as "low wealth" and "high wealth" in our setting. We can
interpret their results as showing a preference for attaching a mean-preserving spread to the higher
wealth level, which is the equivalent of aversion to downside risk in our setting.
10Clearly e Y1 is a ￿rst-order increase in risk over e X1 and e Y2 is a second-order increase
in risk over e X2. It is easily seen that A is the 50-50 lottery [ e X1 + e Y2; e Y1 + e X2]
and B is the 50-50 lottery [ e X1 + e X2; e Y1 + e Y2]. Thus, from our Corollary, lottery B
displays more third-order risk, i.e. displays more downside risk, so that anyone who
is prudent (with u000 > 0 in an expected utility framework) would prefer lottery A.
4.2 Precautionary e⁄ects
Consider a simple two-period model of consumption and saving. An individual with
a time-separable preferences has a random labor income of e X at date t = 0 and
income e Y at date t = 1. The individual decides to save some of her income at date
t = 0 and to consume the rest. She must decide on how much to save before learning
the realized value of e X. Thus, her consumption at date t = 0 is e X￿s, where s is the
amount saved. If s < 0, the consumer is borrowing money (i.e. negative savings)
and consuming more than the realized value of e X at date t = 0. We assume that the
interest rate for borrowing or lending is zero and that there is no time-discounting
for valuing consumption at date t = 1. At this date the individual consumes her
income plus any savings, e Y + s. Let s￿ denote the individual￿ s optimal choice for
savings.
Suppose that e X dominates e Y via Nth-order stochastic dominance. For any
11nonnegative scalar ’ ￿ 0, since ’ dominates ￿’ by FSD, it follows from Theorem 3
that the 50-50 lottery [( e X ￿’);(e Y +’)] dominates [( e X +’);(e Y ￿’)] by (N +1)th-
order stochastic dominance . Reinterpreting the "50-50 lottery" [A;B] as sequential
consumption of A at t = 0 and B at t = 1, Theorem 3 implies that saving an arbitrary
amount ’ ￿ 0 always dominates saving the amount ￿’, whenever preferences satisfy
(N+1)th-order stochastic dominance preference. It follows that we must have s￿ ￿ 0
for this individual.
For example, suppose that e X is a constant equal to Ee Y and that preferences are
given by expected utility. Then this result coincides with the classical case examined
by Leland [19], Sandmo [26] and Kimball [16], for the case where preferences display
prudence, u000 ￿ 0. Even without an expected-utility preference functional, this
precautionary saving demand (s￿ ￿ 0) would extend to any preferences that dislike
an increase in third-degree risk, as de￿ned by Ekern [8]. Moreover, we can now
easily extend this basic result in several directions:
(1) Suppose that one￿ s labor income is risky in both periods, but it is riskier in the
sense of a second-degree increase in risk at date t = 1. Anyone with preferences
exhibiting an aversion to downside risk (i.e. prudence) would prefer to save money
rather than to borrow money.
(2) As opposed to (1), suppose that income in the second period is stochastically
12lower in the sense of FSD. In that case, aversion to downside risk is no longer
required to generate a demand for precautionary saving. We only need someone to
be averse to risk increases of degree two, i.e. aversion to mean-preserving spreads.
(3) We can extend (1) to the case where second period wealth is riskier via SSD by
using Theorem 3: A precautionary saving demand then requires both aversion to
downside risk and aversion to mean preserving spreads.
(4) Finally, we get the general case stated above, where e X dominates e Y via Nth-order
stochastic dominance: A precautionary demand is generated whenever preferences
satisfy (N + 1)th-degree stochastic dominance preference.
4.3 A Non-Precautionary Example
We consider here an example applying Theorem 3 with N = 1 and M = 2, but that
is not an example of a precautionary e⁄ect. Consider a risk-neutral corporation
with taxable pro￿t e X in country A and taxable pro￿t e Y in country B. We assume
that the tax schedule is identical in both countries and that e X SSD e Y . The tax
owed on realized pro￿t ￿ is denoted by t(￿). The tax schedule is assumed to be
increasing with a marginal tax rate that is also increasing, but at a decreasing rate.10
After tax pro￿ts can thus be written as u(￿) = ￿ ￿ t(￿). If t(￿) is di⁄erentiable,
10This assumption is realistic since the marginal rate is often bounded by some maximum, such
as ￿fty percent of additional pro￿t, and certainly is strictly bounded by 100 percent.
13our assumptions about t imply that u00(￿) < 0 and u000(￿) > 0. Moreover, since we
should also have t0(￿) < 1 for any pro￿t level ￿, it follows that u0(￿) > 0 as well.
Suppose now that the corporation has a new project with a pre-tax distribution
of pro￿t e Z, where e Z > 0 a.s. The corporation must decide whether to locate the
project in country A or in country B. The after-tax total pro￿t of the corporation
is given by u(￿A) + u(￿B), where ￿i denotes the realized pre-tax pro￿t in country
i, for i = A;B. Since e Z dominates zero by FSD, it follows from Theorem 3 that
E[u( e X)+u(e Y + e Z)] > E[u( e X+ e Z)+u(e Y )], since the valuation function u (i.e. after-
tax pro￿ts) satis￿es third-order stochastic dominance preference. Thus, the ￿rm
should locate the new project in country B in order to maximize its global after-tax
pro￿t.
4.4 Tempering E⁄ects of Risk
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [5] de￿ne temperance using zero-mean risks, which hence
display more second-degree risk than zero. By our Corollary, we know that tem-
perance is equivalent to this lottery preference for any f e Xa; e Xb; e Yb; e Yag with e Yi hav-
ing more second-degree risk than e Xi ,i = a;b, not just the particular case with
e Xa = e Xb = 0. Moreover, if we restrict individuals to those being risk averse (de￿ned
as an aversion to mean-preserving spreads) and prudent, then they will be temperate
14if and only if they exhibit the lottery preference in Theorem 3 with N = M = 2.
Kimball [17] de￿nes a key behavior consequence of temperance; namely, that an
unavoidable risk will ￿lead an agent to reduce exposure to another [independent]
risk.￿ In our model, we obtain a variant of Kimball￿ s tempering e⁄ect: an unavoid-
ably higher level of risk in one state will lead one to reduce exposure to a second risk
in that state.11 Here, higher or lower "risk" is characterized via SSD.
We can easily extend the notion of tempering e⁄ects to higher orders of risk.
For example, Lajeri [18] studies the e⁄ects of background risks on precautionary
savings and in doing so, examines the condition of decreasing absolute temperance.
A necessary condition for this property within her expected-utility framework is
u(5) > 0, which she labels as "edginess." By choosing M = 2 and N = 3, we can
interpret edginess as implying that a decrease in one risk (via SSD) helps to temper
the e⁄ects of an increase in downside risk of another additive risk.
Interestingly, we can obtain a second equivalence for temperance that has nothing
whatsoever to do with tempering e⁄ects, by letting N = 3 and M = 1. Let
e Ya be an increase in downside risk over e Xa (as in Section 4.1), and let e Xb FSD
e Yb. The (stochastically) higher wealth in e Xb helps to mitigate the e⁄ects of the
increased downside risk in e Ya. Thus, we prefer to pair e Xb together with e Ya in our
11Our decision concerns where to allocate a second unavoidable risk. The optimal level of an
endogenous second risk is examined by Gollier and Pratt [10].
15lottery preference. In the special case where e Xb and e Yb are both constants, we get
a precautionary e⁄ect as previously described. But note how this equivalence for
"temperance" does not describe any type of tempering e⁄ect. Instead, it implies
that the property of temperance yields a precautionary e⁄ect in protecting against
increases in downside risk of future labor income. Similarly, by choosing M = 1 and
N = 4, we can use our Corollary to interpret edginess as implying a precautionary
e⁄ect against increases in fourth-degree risk for future labor income.
4.5 Risk Apportionment
We can characterize risk apportionment, as de￿ned by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
[5], by setting e Xi = 0, so that we have 0 ￿i e Yi. If this partial ordering is determined
via ith-order increases in risk, their characterization of risk apportionment results as
a special case of our model, with M + N equal to the degree of risk apportionment.
For example, for M + N = 6, de￿ne e X2 = 0, e Y2 = e "3, e X4 = [e "1;e "2], e Y4 = [0;e "1 +e "2],
where the e "i are all mutually independent zero-mean risks. It follows that e X2 ￿2 e Y2
and e X4 ￿4 e Y4. The Corollary then gives us the precise decomposition for risk
apportionment of order 6, as described in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [5, Figure 1].
Our approach extends their risk apportionment characterizations, by replacing ith-
degree risk orderings with orderings by ith-order stochastic dominance.
16Higher-order risk e⁄ects, such as prudence and temperance, are being examined
in non-expected utility models, which hitherto have used various ways to even de￿ne
such concepts, e.g. Chateauneuf et al. [3] and Eichner [7]. The lottery preferences we
use to characterize prudence, temperance, and higher orders of risk apportionment
also can be applied within such non-expected utility models.
It is worth noting that our main results are not utility based. Stochastic domi-
nance and increases in ith-order risks are purely statistical properties. Indeed, the
u functions used in our proof of Theorem 3 need not represent anyone￿ s utility; they
are used only as a mathematical device in the proof.
5 Concluding Remarks
Hedging has long been a capstone of risk-management strategy. Faced with an
initially risky wealth prospect, one can add a position in another asset whose payo⁄
is negatively correlated to the original risky wealth. Such an asset will usually have a
positive net payo⁄in states of the world in which the random wealth would otherwise
have been low. If we assume risk aversion, then marginal utility in low-wealth states
is higher and therefore such a hedge is valuable to a risk averter. The cost of such
hedging is that the net payo⁄ is usually negative in states of the world in which the
random wealth would otherwise have been high. In a certain sense, hedging pairs
17up relatively good outcomes on one asset with relatively bad outcomes on another
asset, and vice versa.
By contrast, risk apportionment pairs relatively good assets with relatively bad
ones. It assumes that the payo⁄s on the assets are independent, which is antithetical
to the premise of hedging. Given the partial ordering in (3), we prefer a 50-50 gamble
between the two "inner risks" as opposed to the two outer ones. Here relatively
"good" and "bad" are determined via di⁄erences in ith-degree risk.
If we expand relatively "good" and "bad" to be de￿ned by ith-order stochastic
dominance, then, under expected utility, this ranking coincides with a utility function
(or some other valuation function) whose derivatives alternate in sign. If these
rankings hold for all orders of stochastic dominance, then they would coincide with
preferences that are completely monotone, as described by Brockett and Golden [2]
and Pratt and Zeckhauser [24].
We provided several interpretations and applications of Theorem 3 and its Corol-
lary. Our results also can be used to add intuition to many other extant concepts in
the literature, such as skewness preference (see Chiu [4]) and transfer principles in
income redistribution (see Fishburn and Willig [9] and Moyes [23]). Moreover, our
results can be useful in situations where preferences over the lotteries are reversed.
For example, a decision maker might prefer mean-preserving increases in risk over
18the domain of losses, or might prefer increases in downside risk over the domain of
gains.12 The equivalences in our paper easily allow for such adaptation.
The lottery preference described in this paper extends the concept of "risk appor-
tionment," as introduced by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger [5]. One strength of their
result is the simplicity of their characterization of lower levels of risk apportion-
ment via a preference over simple 50-50 lotteries. However, their characterization is
less simple for higher orders, since it requires that they construct larger and larger
nestings of simple lotteries.
A strength of this paper is that we can characterize any degree of risk apportion-
ment by a preference between two simple 50-50 lotteries that di⁄er in their levels
of ith-degree risk. In some instances, decisions are indeed about how to apportion
"lotteries" across two states (or two time periods, or two ￿rms, or two groups of
people). Our model shows how such decisions often can be made independent of a
particular utility function or even a particular preference functional, as long as we
believe that valuations exhibit aversion to increases in ith-degree risk. Moreover, our
extension of risk apportionment to stochastic dominance rankings should prove quite
useful in future research, since stochastic dominance rankings are more common in
12For example, Wong [28] essentially de￿nes the ￿rst three orders of stochastic dominance over
the de-cumulative distribution function and refers to these respectively as "descending stochastic
dominance" of each order.
19the extant literature.
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